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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to account for inter-state variations in public health 
expenditures in an economically "have" nation, the United States, and in a 
"have-not" nation, India. Three theoretical models, derived from studies 
of social welfare expenditures in the American state, are formalized and 
tested in both societies. Though not a major objective of this paper, a 
relatively unknown method of model testing with important advantages for 
comparative research is described. The principal findings of this paper are 
as follows. One of the models tested here, that associated with the work of 
Dye and Dawson and Robinson, is found to explain variations in the 
budgetary proportions the American states devoted to public health. None 
of the models, however, is able to account for inter-state differences in per 
capita spending for health in the United States. Finally, none of the 
theoretical models is able to explain variations among the Indian states 
either in per capita spending or in the budgetary share devoted to public 
health. Possible reason for the limitations of the models are discussed. 
In recent years the determinants of policies and expenditures of sub-
national governments have become subjects of considerable scholarly 
research. While such research has largely focused on the American states 
(see Dye, 1966; Sharkansky, 1968; Hofferbert and Sharkansky, 1971; Brady 
and Murray, 1975; Gray, 1976), several important cross-cultural, cross-
national investigations have also been conducted. For example, Hogan 
(1972) examined the relative influence of socioeconomic and political 
variables on the expenditures of Mexican states and Canadian provinces. 
Similarly, Glassberg (1973) reported on the linkage between voting behavior 
and policy outputs in New York and London. 
Authors' Note: The authors are grateful to David Brady and Kim Quaile Hill for their ad-
monitions regarding an earlier draft. 
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The results of these studies have yielded important insights into the 
causes of variation in subnational, government expenditures and, especially, 
into the relative influence of socioeconomic and political variables in ac-
counting for variation . A number of significant gaps remain, however, both 
in knowledge and in theory development. First, most studies have involved 
multivariate statistical analysis to the important end of data reduction. Few, 
however, have sought to estimate coefficients in a theoretical model and to 
test hypotheses about such a model in different cultural settings. Accord-
ingly, there are almost no cross-cultural theories of why relatively 
autonomous, subnational governments spend as they do. Second, only a 
limited number of comparative investigations have involved nation-states 
which stand at the extremes of affluence and poverty. Yet, Peters (1972) has 
persuasively demonstrated that at the societal level the influence of political 
as opposed to socioeconomic indicators on social expenditures is likely to 
depend upon the level of economic development. Specifically, his evidence 
indicates that political variables are more important in accounting for the 
social expenditures of transitional societies while economic variables are 
more important for societies that have attained the modern stage of 
development. A further exploration of differences between wealthy and im-
poverished nations, then, seems essential to an understanding of sub-
national expenditures. Finally, several major policy areas remain relatively 
neglected topics of study, even in the American context. For example, 
despite recent popular interest in national health insurance and health care 
delivery systems in the United States, states' spending on public health has 
not received the same attention accorded welfare and education. 
The present paper seeks to increase our knowledge and theory by for-
mulating and testing alternative models of states' public health expenditures 
in India and the United States. In addition, though not a major objective of 
this study, a relatively unknown method of model testing with several ad-
vantages for comparative research will be described. Three theoretical 
models will initially be derived from existing studies of the social welfare ex-
penditures of the American states . Following an examination of public 
health policies, these alternative models will then be tested cross-
comparatively for their ability to account for inter-state variations in health 
spending in both India and the United States . 
The Indian and American states have been selected here for investiga-
tion for several important reasons. Both India and the United States are 
federal systems whose states enjoy considerable autonomy in making expen-
diture decisions. Also, both countries are politically and socioeconomically 
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diverse with substantial subnational variations in such important factors as 
interparty competition and economic development. And both have com-
petitive political parties, operating in free elections, ' which encourage 
popular participation. On the other hand, they stand at the extremes of af-
fluence and poverty and thus afford a compari son of subnational, govern-
ment expenditures in a "have" and a "have-not" nation. 
THEORIES OF SUBNATIONAL VARIATIONS IN EXPENDITURES 
At least three theoretical models of variations in welfare expenditures 
may be found in recent studies of spending by the American states. The first 
of these models has its origins in the writings of V.O. Key, Jr. and Duane 
Lockard. In his monumental study of Southern Politics, Key (1949; 307) 
emphasized the importance of inter-party competition-or its absence-to 
programmatic politics. More specifically, Key took party competition or bi-
factionalism as the primary indicator of the degree to which politics was 
"organized" or "disorganized" within a state. An organized politics, he 
hypothesized, was necessary to the promotion of programs which benefit 
the socially disadvantaged. On the other hand, in a disorganized politics, he 
predicted, the disadvantaged could not effectively promote their interests 
and thus would "lose" in the long-run. 
Key's hypotheses received further elaboration by Duane Lockard. ln 
his study of the politics of the New England states, Lockard (1959; 
336-337) suggested that inter-party competition is more likely to flourish in 
states characterized by relatively complex, developed economics. He then 
showed that two-party competitive states were inclined to spend more for social 
welfare programs (including aid to the blind, old-age assistance, and aid to 
families with dependent children) than were their one-party counterparts. 
Formally, these ideas and findings may be expressed by the following 
mathematical model: 
'As of this writing, free elections have been suspended in India . Nevertheles s, the data 
used in this paper derive from a perod in which election s in India were free and open. 
X , (exogenous) 
x 2 = b 2 ,x, + u 
x l = bl2x 2 + v 
Model I 
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Where X , is economic development, X 2 is inter-party competition, X1 
is social welfare spending, and u and v are errors or disturbances. 
For convenience of mathematical expression, all variables in this model 
are assumed to be measured from their respective means. This assumption 
may be expressed in the language of expectations 2 or expected values: 
E(X) = E(X 2) = E(X 3) = E(u) = E(v) = 0 
Finally, a test of this model requires the following specification on the 
" error s" or "disturbances:" 
E(X ,u) = E(X ,v) = E(X 2v) = 0 
That is, the disturbance in each equation has an expected covariance of zero 
with the variables predetermined in that and all previous equations in the 
model. From this specification it also follow s that the disturbances 
them selves have an expected zero covariance (i.e. are "uncorrelated"): 
E(u,v) = 0 
(The importance of this specification to model testing is discussed below.) 
The second theoretical model of expenditures is most closely associated 
with the work of Thomas Dye (1966) and that of Richard Dawson and 
James Robinson (I 963). According to this model, economic development is 
a determinant of party competition and of many policy outputs in the 
American states. Party competition, however, tends to have almost no in-
dependent effect on outputs. Rather, most of any relationship between party 
competition and policy outputs is a resultant of associations between 
economic development and party competition, and between development 
and outputs. Variations in the expenditures of states are thus determined by 
differences in levels of economic development and not by differences in 
inter-party competitio!}. 
Thi s model may be formally expressed in the following manner: 
X, (exogenous) Model 11 
x 2 = b2 ,x, + u 
X 3 = b3 ,X, + v 
Where all symbols are the same as above. 
'For the reader unfamili ar with the algebra of expectation s, see Hays (1963), App endix 8 . 
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This model requires the following specifications on the disturbances: 
Again, 
E(X,) = E(X) = E(X3) = E(u) = E(v) = 0 
A third model of expenditures in the American states was recently for-
malized and tested by Charles Cnudde and Donald Mccrone (1969). This 
model suggests that economic development has a direct effect on social 
welfare expenditure s as well as an indirect effect via party competition. 
That is, a state's welfare spending is directly determined by that state's level 
of economic development. In addition spending is also indirectly deter-
mined by development through the intervening variable of inter-party com-
petition. 
Expressed formall )'., 
X , (exogenous) 
x 2 = b2 ,x , + u 
X 3 = b32 X 2 + b3 ,X , + v 
Where all symbols are the same. 
Again, 
Model III 
E(X,) = E(X 2) = E(X 3) = E(u) = E(v) = 0 
The requisite specifications on the disturbances for this model are as 
follows: 
E(X ,u) = E(X ,v) = E(X 2v) = E(uv) = 0 
To date, neither this nor the other two theoretical models of expen-
diture variation have been tested cross-nationally. The principal aim of this 
paper is to provide such a test with respect to public health expenditures in 
India and the United States. Before doing so, however, public health 
policies in these two nation-states will be examined. 
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PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
Health is an important public policy area in both India and the United 
States and in recent years has received increased attention from policy 
makers. In India major developments and changes in the public health field 
came after independence in 1947. During the earlier, colonial period, 
families and religious institutions were primarily responsible for the care of 
the infirm. But with independence, the national government and the states 
committed themselves to programs intended to provide minimally adequate 
health care to all persons (Woytinsky, 1969). 
Despite considerable national legislation, however, the role of the cen-
tral government of India in public health has generally been quite limited. 
The central government has been involved in nation-wide planning, inter-
national health, and research in addition to providing some financial 
assistance. But actual health services and health policy making are a state 
responsibility. In fact, the Constitution of India specifically charges the 
states with these obligations (Hilleboe, Barkhuus, and Thomas, 1972). 
This constitutional autonomy of the states in the area of public health 
is reflected in considerable inter-state variation in health expenditures. 
Table 1 displays the percentage of each state's total budget devoted to 
public health as well as per capital health expenditures for the fiscal year 
1968-69 - the most recent year for which complete and reliable data could 
be obtained. 3 As the table indicates the State of Rajasthan devoted almost 
11 percent of its operating budget to public health; in contract, Gujarat 
devoted only 4.36 per cent of its budget to this area. Considering per capita 
expenditures, Jammu and Kashmir spent about 8.5 rupees per person com-
pared to the only 2.47 rupees expended by Gujarat. Such figures are in-
dicative of substantial variations in the ways the Indian states have chosen 
to exercise their public health responsibilities. 
' Because we strongly suspect that the data reported for Uttar Pradesh was erroneous, this 
state has been completely omitted from our analysis. When the analysis was done with Uttar 
Pradesh included, no significant differences were found. 
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TABLE 1 
Public Health Expenditures of Indian States, 1968-69 
State 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Kujarat 
Haryana 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Madras (Tamilnadu) 
Maharashtra 
Mysore 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
West Bengal 
Percent of Total Budget 
on Public Health 
8.33 
7.26 
8.80 
4.36 
6.25 
7.23 
9.77 
9.11 
7.37 
8.36 
6.71 
6.98 
7.19 
10.89 
9.00 
Mean: 7.62 
Standard 
Deviation: 1.59 
Source: Statesmen's Yearbook, 1968-69. 
Per Capita 
Expenditures in Rs 
3.92 
4.45 
2.50 
2.47 
4.13 
8.54 
6.62 
3.93 
4.42 
5.36 
4.19 
3.89 
6.02 
5.99 
4.36 
Mean: 4 .53 
Standard 
Deviation: 1.58 
Public health in the United States, by way of comparison, has witnessed 
a growing and increasingly diversified involvement on the part of the na-
tional government. In spite of this growing federal involvement, however, 
public health continues to be one of the primary responsibilities of the 
American states. State governments generally provide supervision over local 
health departments, financial assistance to localjties and, through state 
health departments, health care in areas without local health agencies. 
Probably the most important state responsiblity, however, is the provisio n 
of specialized state hospitals for the care of the mentally ill and for those 
who have contracted tuberculosis and cancer. Such hospitals are operate d 
directly by the states and are intended to make available services that local 
governments could not afford (See Dye, 1973; 478-81). 
As is true in India, the American states are not equally involved in the 
provision of health services and facilities. Differences in the extent of state 
activity are again suggested by the proportion of each states budget 
allocated to health and by the amounts expended per capita. Table 2 
represents these data for fiscal year 1968-69 - the same year considered 
above for India. As the table indicates, Georgia devoted the largest 
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budgetary share to public health: nearly 11.5 per cent of its total budget was 
spent in this area. In contrast, South Dakota devoted only 3.23 per cent to 
health. Considering per capita expenditures, New York ranked first among 
the states having spent over $84 per person while South Dakota again 
qualified for last place by spending only about $19.50 per person. Thus 
there is considerable inter-state variation in the commitment of resources to 
public health. 
TABLE 2 
Public Health Expenditures of American States, 1968-69 
State 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hempshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Table 2 co111inued on page 48 
Percent of Total Budget 
on Public Health 
8.1 I 
3.41 
4.65 
6.44 
6.39 
7.29 
6.61 
5.58 
9.18 
11.49 
5.73 
6.68 
6.66 
7.74 
5.87 
7.09 
5.72 
7.60 
4.97 
7.98 
7.72 
7.74 
7.21 
8.16 
4.51 
8.85 
5.91 
6.19 
5.35 
10.30 
7.40 
3.40 
6.13 
Per Capita 
Expenditure in $ 
36.07 
41.65 
26.81 
28.54 
49.94 
44.16 
38.48 
39.40 
44.53 
54.62 
45.74 
33.16 
37.14 
37.64 
34.94 
35.94 
28.66 
40.18 
23.87 
49.07 
49.16 
47.58 
31.42 
39.78 
26.28 
68.03 
28.68 
32.75 
32.57 
84.13 
28.86 
21.26 
29.08 
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TABLE 2 
Public Health Expenditures of American States, 1968-69 
State 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Percent of Total Budge/ 
on Public Hea//h 
5.80 
4.93 
5.39 
6.04 
9.54 
3.23 
8.96 
6.49 
4.70 
3.79 
6.89 
5.61 
5.88 
6.05 
7.11 
Mean: 6.55 
Standard 
Deviation: I. 75 
Source: Government Finances, 1968-69. 
MODEL TESTING 
Per Capi1a 
Expendi!ure in $ 
29.73 
30.85 
27.58 
36.02 
36.28 
19.41 
38.80 
28.69 
27.59 
24.18 
31.41 
36.49 
27.33 
39.41 
67.58 
Mean: 37.32 
Standard 
Deviation: 12.41 
Having considered public health policy and inter-state variations in 
health expenditures in both India and the United States, the three alter-
native models of spending will now be tested in both nation-states. The two 
measures just discussed, the proportion of each state's budget devoted to 
public health and a state's per capita health expenditures, constitute the 
dependent variables for purposes of model testing. Data on these two 
measures for India were obtained from the Statesmen's Yearbook for fiscal 
year 1968-69. As already noted, this was the most recent year for which 
complete and reliable data could be obtained. To insure comparability, data 
on these same two measures were also gathered for the same fiscal year 
from Government Finances in 1968-69. 
It proved considerably more difficult to obtain comparable measures 
of states' economic development and inter-party competition for both 
countries. Conceptually similar, though by no means identical, scales of 
economic development were constructed from the results of a series of fac-
tor analyses. The final factor solution for each country is presented in Table 
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3. The measures included in the analyses for India were obtained from the 
1971 Census of India; those for the United States from the U.S. Census of 
Housing and Population, 1970. The development scale for each country 
was constructed by additively combining the variable listed in Table 3 after 
weighting each variable by its respective factor score coefficient.• 
TABLE 3 
Economic Development Factors for the States of India 
and the United States 0 
India United States 
Electricity consumption per capita .899 Median School years completed 
Per capita income . 747 Percent black in the population 
Gross industrial output .671 Median family income 
Number of motor vehicles/ 10,000 Percent engaged in 
persons .610 manufacturing 
Percent literate in the population .499 Percent living in urban areas 
Eigenvalue 2.95396 Eigenvalue 
.980 
-.725 
.588 
-.428 
.336 
2.52114 
3Entries denote factor loadings of variables derived from principal factors solution. 
Factors were rotated to varimax criteria. 
Comparable, cross-national measures of inter-party competition were 
difficult to obtain largely owing to the existence of a multi-party system in 
India. The measure finally selected for India is one involving the difference 
between the number of seats held by the party with the lagest representation 
in a state's lower legislative house and the number held by the party with 
second largest representation in that same house. The smaller the difference 
between the shares of seats, the more competitive the parties are considered 
to be; the larger the difference, the less competitive. 5 Allocations of 
legislative seats which resulted from elections held in 1967 were used. 
This measure of competition was utilized for two important reasons. 
First, since this research is concerned with state policies, it was deemed im-
portant to employ a measure based upon party apportionment in state 
legislatures. Second, India's political system is modeled after the British 
system wherein the lower house is the more powerful, both traditionally and 
constitutionally, of the two state houses. 
'On this conventional scaling procedure see Kerlinger (1973), chapter 29. 
'On measures of party competition see Gopal and Hahn {1966), Rae (1967), and Milder 
(1974). A second measure of party competition for India was also employed: the percentage of 
seats held by the largest party in a state's lower house . Nearly identical results were obtained 
using this measure. 
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The measure chosen for the United States is one previously employed 
by Thomas Dye (1966; 54-59) in his study of state policy outputs. It is simply 
the percentage of seats held by the majority party in a state's lower house . 6 
This indicant was calculated from the apportionment of seats in the session 
immediately following the 1968 state elections. 
Most studies of the determinants of expenditure variations either have 
employed correlational techniques or have made use of standardized re-
gression coefficients. Unfortunately, neither methodology is satisfactory 
for comparative research. As Otis Dudley Duncan has demonstrated (1975; 
Chapter 4) it could happen that the structural parameters or coefficients of 
a model are identical of two or more populations under study. Yet, if only 
the variance in the exogeneous variable(s) of the model differ(s) fro m 
population to population, differences, would in general be observe d 
between the populations in all the correlations and in all the standardize d 
regression coefficients. That is, estimates of population correlations and 
standardized coefficients will (in general) suggest that the populations diffe r 
in only one : the variance of the exogeneous variable(s). It is, therefore, 
possible to draw erroneous inferences about the comparative nature of 
theory through the use of these strength of association measures. 
Such erroneous inferences can be avoided by not expressing the 
variables in standard form (i.e. dividing out the variances) when calculati ng 
ordinary-least-squares estimates of the coefficients in the model. In this way 
differences between the objects of explanatory interest, the structural coef-
ficients of the model, and the variances and covariances that describe the 
joint distribution of the variables in a population will not be obscured . This 
is the procedure followed here . (For an extended discussion and elaborati on 
see Duncan, 1975). 
The concern of the paper, however, is not merely in testing a single 
model in two populations but in choosing among three models in both India 
and the United States. To demonstrate the method of model testing and 
selection employed here, the proportion of each state's budget spent on 
public health will be used as the dependent variable. Observe that one dif-
'T he Pear son's correlation between the percentage of seats held by the Democratic Party 
in state senates and state lower hou ses was .969. This high correlation indicate s that almost 
nothing could have been gained by including the partisan distribution of seats in upper state 
hou ses. 
Because the legislature s of Nebraska and Minnesota are nonpartisan, these two states are 
omitted from the remainder of this analysis. 
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ference between Model III and Models I and II is that Model III contains 
the following prediction not contained in the others: 
x 1 = b32X2 + b1,x , + v (Eq. A) 
Where symbols are as noted above. 
If this prediction is sustained by the data, then Model III receives some sup -
port and the other prediction equation in the model may then be tested. If it 
is not sustained by the evidence, however, Model III may be rejected and 
Model s I and II considered. 
To determine if the prediction (Eq. A) is supported by the data is to 
estimate the structural coefficients in the equation. Thi s estimation was ac-
compli shed using a method described by Duncan (1975). The method in-
volves calculating the coefficients from estimates of population variances 
and covariances which can be computed from available data. As will be 
seen, the principal advantage of this approach is that it shows directly how a 
model generates the observable covariances. To illustrate , Eq . A was first 
multiplied by one of the variables predetermined in the equation (either X , 
or X 2). Taking X ,, 
x ,xl = b32x ,x 2 + b1,x ,x , + X,v 
Taking expectations or expected values, 
E(X 1X 1) = b12 E(X 1X2) + b11 (X 1X,) + E(X ,v) 
Then , making use of the fact that the expected value of (X ,X ,) is equal to 
the variance of X,; the expected value of (X, v) = 0 by assumption (see 
Model III above); and that the expected value of (XiXj) = covariance of 
X;Xi where i * j yields, 
a-,1 = b 12et ,2 + b 1, a- ,, (Eq. B) 
Where et 13 and et 21 are covariances and et II is the variance in X ,. (It is 
important to note that the variables are not in standard form. If they were, 
et II would equal unity and Eq. B could be further reduced.) The covariance 
between the dependent variables (X 1) and X , has thus been expressed as a 
function of the structural coefficients in Eq. A (the b's), the covariance 
between X, and X 2 , and the variance in X ,. 
Next, Eq. A was multiplied by the other predetermined variable in the 
equation, X2 , and expectations taken, 
a-21 = b 12et22 + b 1, a-2, 
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Where a 23 and a 2 , are covariances and a 22 is the variance in X 2 • 
Again , an expres sion was obtained which relate s covariance s, the structura l 
coefficients of the model, and a variance term. 
Then the structural coefficient s in Eq . A could be calculated . Observe 
that the procedures just employed re sulted in two new equation s (B and C) 
in two unknowns (b31 and b32 ) and in five terms (variance s and covariances) 
which, because they could be computed directly from the data, are 
"known" term s . Thu s the unknown term s, the structural coefficients, 
could easily be solved uniquely. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the variance s and covariance s for the variables 
in the models for India and the United Sates, respectively. Subst ituting into 
equations B and C with the proportion of total state spending on public 
health as the dependent variable: 
India 
United States 
( - .4402) = b32 ( - .3488) + b 31 (.8575) 
(2.2804) = b32 (336.678) + b3 , ( - .3488) 
( - .6835) = b 32 (7.1346) + bl, (.988) 
( - 4.9096) = b32 (213.551) + b3 , (7.1346) 
Solving both sets of equations simultaneou sly produced the following 
values: 
India 
United State s 
b32 = .00624 
b l2 = - .0015 
b3 , = - .51081 
bl, = - .68355 
Substituting these values into Eq. A for both India and the United 
States, 
India X 3 = .00624X 2 - .51081X , 
S.E. .02382 .47196 
F .069 1.171 
R2 = .09 
United States X 3 = - .0015X 2 - .68555X , 
S.E .. 01881 .27518 
F .000 6.170 
R2 = .15 
As an aid to model acceptance or rejection, standard errors and F-ratios 
have also been calculated and included along with the equations. 
TABLE 4 
Variances and Covariances Computed for lndia 0 
N = 15 
Economic 
Development 
Party 
Competition 
Health Percent 
of Budget 
Per Capita 
Economic 
Development 
.8575 
- .3488 
-.4402 
Health Spending .1345 
Party 
Competition 
336.678 
2.2804 
-12.6584 
Health 
Percent 
of Budget 
2.5304 
.7952 
Per Capita 
Health 
Spending 
2.4844 
aoiagonal entries denote variances; off-diagonal entries denote covariances. 
TABLE 5 
Variances and Covariances Computed for the United States 0 
N = 48 
Health Per Capita 
Economic Party Percent Health 
Development Competition of Budget Spending 
Economic 
Development .9982 
Party 
Competition 7.1346 213.551 
Health Percent 
of Budget -.6835 -4.9096 3.0576 
Per Capita 
Health Spending 1.8289 29.6688 14.2869 154.1298 
aDiagonal entries denote variances; off-diagonal entries denote covariances. 
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An examination of these structural coefficients (b's) and associated 
statistics indicate that Eq. A is not supported by the data for either India or 
the United States. For India the standard error of each coefficient is quite 
large and the corresponding F-ratio quite small. Thus the coefficients do 
not approach statistical significance at the .10 level-the level of type I 
error used throughout this paper. For the United States, the b11 coefficient 
( - .68355) is considerably larger than its associated standard error and the 
corresponding F-ratio indicates that this coefficient is statistically signifi-
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cant from zero. Since all coefficients in an equation must differ from zero at 
statistically significant levels in order for the equation to be supported by 
the data, Eq. A cannot be accepted for either country. Furthermore, as a 
consequence of failing to accept Eq. A for both countries with respect to 
percentage of the budget devoted to public health, Model III in which this 
prediction is found must be rejected. 
Using identical reasoning and procedures, the ability of Model Ill to 
account for variations in states' per capita health expenditures was then 
tested. Values for structural coefficients were again calculated from the 
variances and covariances presented in Tables 4 and 5. Standard errors and 
F-ratios were also calculated. The results were as follows, 
India 
United States 
X 3 = - .03745X2 + .14164X, 
S.E. .0220 .43997 
F 2.845 
F2 = .20 
X3 = .10210X2 
S.E. .14276 
.104 
+ l.10229X, 
2.08797 
F .512 .279 
R2 = .03 
These results are generally the same as those obtained above for pro-
portion of the budget devoted to public health. That is, the equation cannot 
be accepted for either country since the structural coefficients have high 
corresponding standard errors and fail to differ significantly from zero as 
indicated by the F-ratios. Accordingly, Model lII may also be rejected as an 
explanation for variations in per capita health expenditures in India and the 
United States. 1 
Having rejected Model Ill, Models I and 11 were then tested. Structural 
coefficients were calculated for the equations in these models according to 
the procedures outlined above. Standard errors and F-ratios for the coef-
ficients were also computed. The results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
'Sca tterplots of residuals were examined for evidence of curvilinearity and 
heteroscedasticity . No evidence of either nonlinearity or heteroscedasticity was detected in any 
of the relationships for India. For the United States, however, some evidence of curvilinearity 
was found in the relationship between economic development and party competition. Also, 
heteroscedascity was found in the scatterplot of residuals obtained after fitting Eq. A. After 
appropriately transforming variables, the equations for the United States were recomputed. 
Although the structural coefficients for the equations were slightly altered, in no case were the 
basic findings changed. Because the basic results remained the same, and because the concep-
tual meaning of transformed variables is often difficult to determine, the recomputed co-
efficients are not presented here . 
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Both Models I and II predict that inter-party competition will be a 
linear function of economic development. Consequently, the test of this 
prediction is presented at the top of each table. Tests of the remaining equa-
tions are presented separately for the two models and for both dependent 
variables. 
As Table 6 indicates, neither Model I nor Model II may be accepted for 
India . Contrary to the prediction of both models, economic development 
was not found to influence inter-party competition at statistically signifi-
cant levels. Furthermore, with a single exception (to be discussed), the other 
predictions of the models are also not supported at significant levels. Thus 
none of the three theoretical models developed in American state analyses 
explains variations in public health expenditures in India. 
TABLE 6 
Tests of Models I and ff for India 
Model s I and II 
X, = - .40674X , + u 
S.E. 5.49433 
F. .005 
R' = .0004 
Per cent of Budget Denoted 
to Health 
Model I 
x, = .00677X, + V 
S.E . .02397 
F. . 080 
R' = .006 
Model II 
x, = - .51335X , + u 
S.E. .45465 
F. 1.275 
R' = .09 
Per Capita Spending in 
Health 
x, = - .03760X, + V 
S.E . .02142 
F. 3.081 
R' = . 19 
x, = . 156688X, + u 
S.E. .47005 
F. .11 I 
R' = .008 
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TABLE 7 
Tests of Models I and II for the United States 
Models I and II 
X, = 7.14681X + u 
S.E. 1.88149 
F . 14.428 
R2 = .24 
Percent of Budget Devoted Per Capita Spending on 
to Health Health 
Model I 
x, = .02299X + v 
S.E . .01731 
F. 1.763 
R' = .04 
Model II 
x, = 
S.E. 
F. 
R' = 
- .68465X 
.23747 
8.312 
.15 
+ u 
x, = 
S.E. 
F. 
R' = 
x, = 
S.E . 
F. 
R' = 
. 13893X 
. 12357 
1.264 
.03 
l .83201X 
1.81203 
1.022 
.02 
+ V 
+ u 
It is noteworthy, however, that the relationship between per capita 
health expenditures and party competition does approach significance at the 
.10 level. While the magnitude of this relationship is not large, it appears 
that inter-party competition has some influence on the number of rupees 
per person an Indian state will spend on public health. The greater the party 
competition in a state, it seems, the less that state is inclined to spend-a 
tendency contrary to that predicted by American state studies. 
Table 7 summarizes the findings for the United States. As is indicated, 
Model II-that associated with the work of Dye, Dawson, and Robinson 
-does explain inter-state variations in the proportion of the budget 
devoted to public health. Economic development is seen to bear a positive 
relationship to party competition at statistically significant levels. Also as 
predicted, development and the percent of the budget spent on health are 
related. This latter relationship is negative in direction suggesting, as 
previous research has shown that poorer states tend to devote a larger pro-
portion of available resources to social welfare than their more affluent 
counterparts (see Dye, 1966, 134-135). Hofferbert and Sharkansky, 1971, 
473). Finally, party competition and percent of the budget are not 
associated at significant levels. Model II may, therefore, be accepted as an 
explanation of the proportion of each state's budget allocated to public 
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health. This is a result well in keeping with the dominant findings of 
American state policy research. 
However, none of the three models can account for per capita spending 
on health by the American states. As Table 7 demonstrates, per capita 
spending is related neither to party competition nor to economic develop-
ment at statistically significant levels. Consequently, all three models may 
be rejected as explanations for inter-state variations in per capita health ex-
penditures. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
To recapitulate, this paper has sought to account for inter-state varia-
tions in public health expenditures in an economically "have" nation, the 
United States, and in a "have-not" nation, India. Three theoretical models, 
derived from studies of social welfare expenditures in the American states, 
have been formalized and tested in both societies. One of the models tested 
here ("Model 11") has been found to explain variations in the budgetary 
proportion the American states devoted to public health. None of the 
models, however, was able to account for inter-state differences in per 
capita spending for health in the United States. Furthermore, none of the 
theoretical models could explain differences between the Indian states either 
in per capita spending or in the budgetary share devoted to public health. 
These findings may be attributed to differences between India and the 
United States in stage of economic development. As noted earlier in this 
paper, Peters has demonstrated at the nation-state level that political 
variables are more important for societies like the United States that have 
reached the modern ("have") stage of economic development. In the same 
way, the relative importance of political as opposed to economic variables 
in accounting for subnational, government expenditures may depend upon 
a nation-state's stage of economic development. Thus among the American 
states, economic development but not inter-party competition was seen to 
bear a significant relationship to the budgetary proportion states devoted to 
public health. Moreover, among the Indian states the relationship between 
party competition and per capita health spending was seen to approach 
significance but not that between economic development and spending. 
Yet, this extension of Peters' stages of economic development argu-
ment fails to explain why states' development was not found related to per 
capita health spending in the United States. Nor does it account for the 
failure of party competition to influence the budgetary proportion the 
Indian states devoted to public health. Consequently, the findings of this 
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research are probably not a product of societal "have-have-not" dif-
ferences. Rather, they may well be attributable to some fundamental limita-
tions of the three theoretical models considered here. 
Possibly one such limitation has to do with the variable of party com-
petition. V.O. Key's theory of social welfare politics, which was the genesis 
of most later studies, did not stress inter-party competition so much as the 
extent to which politics was "organized" or "disorganized" within a state. 
As Morehouse (1973) has recently suggested, it may be that party competi-
tion is a rather imperfect measure of political organization. This seems par-
ticularly likely in India where, unlike the United States, states dominated by 
a single party (the Congress Party) may sustain either the most or the least 
fractionalized politics. Accordingly, future studies might do well to incor-
porate more direct measures of political organization, such as the strength 
of party leadership, into expenditure models. 
A second possible limitation of the models considered here lies in the 
process by which program innovations and, hence, new expenditures are 
adopted. Walker (1969) found important regional differences in the propen-
sities of the American states to adopt program innovations. These dif-
ferences were sufficiently strong to suggest regional patterns of communica-
tion, competition, and emulation among states. Such regional patterns may 
also characterize India: certainly the southern part of that country stands 
apart from the rest owing to its greater industrialization and stronger British 
tradition. If this is so, regionally-based communications and innovative 
"cues" may be sufficiently strong to largely override inter-state differences 
in wealth and party competition in determining per capita expenditures and 
budgetary proportions. Thus it may be necessary to construct models which 
either incorporate measures of innovation or which aggregate key variables 
according to political region. 
Whatever the case, the findings of this paper dictate that American and 
comparative scholars alike search beyond the theories considered here if 
general explanations are to be found for why relatively autonomous, sub-
national governments spend as they do. 
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